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Adventure Follies → General Stuff → The Soviets were not as good in WWII as I gave them credit for
Just came across the Lucy Spy Ring while reading about Kursk.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucy_spy_ring
The Russians had the German battle plans before the Germans in the field did. Barbaroosa, Stalingrad, Kursk, etc.
Yes I was aware, Ultra strikes again.
Well any Ultra connection is pure theory. The people who were involved in ultra have all denied it totally, of course that doesn't prove it wasn't....but most historians have discredited such theories, as Lucy got its information from High ranking Nazis in the German High Command Operations section and other key locations, so they really didn't need the Ultra folks telling them what they already knew. And Ultra certainly didn't photo plans for Citadel...LOL
However British intelligence did get Lucy info after Lucy passed it to the Swiss and the Swiss then to the Brits.
With respect, the "plan" was communicated by radio, and was, as all OKW traffic was, decrypted.
Confirmation was from human resources. As I understand it there was a delay in communicating the intel to the Soviets because of the concern about security, but with Lucy as the fall guy, it was OK to tell the Russians.
As it happened the delay was not fatal as Citadel was postponed to allow the latest batch of Panthers to Grossdeutchland (only the Northern pincer had the new panthers)
Stalin had the basic plan in April, the only thing they didn't know until later was the start date which kept being postponed. Citadel was originally slated for May until Hitler started interfering with the time table.
As you said the plan was communicated by Lucy to the Soviets by radio, but the plans were also photographed to get them to Lucy for transmission.
Anyhow with the deputy head of the Abwehr and some of the other people involved in Lucy, they certainly didn't need Bletchley Park to give them information that they knew long before and had already sent to the Russians.
The Russians did have some use for the Ultra stuff as confirmation of previous I'm sure, but they could get that from their own spies inside Brit intelligence who read all the ultra transcripts....the Cambridge 5.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Cairncross
BTW the Soviets had also broken enigma by late 1942. The Poles had done most of the prep work in the 30s so not really surprising, not to mention the Soviets having penetrated Brit intelligence so deeply.
Radio traffic between OKW and OKH was routinely decrypted as was all traffic from OKH to army groups down to corps level and divisional level so far as Waffen SS units were concerned. The same messages being sent to a larger number of units decrypted or otherwise tells you something is up.
The Russians were often in possession of operational plans throughout the middle and later part of the war, well before the actual recipients of those orders. This only highlights their sheer incompetence.
This only highlights their sheer incompetence.
Whose incompetence are you referring to, it isn't clear, the Soviets, or the people they were constantly stealing intelligence from?
Anyhow, as far as the Russians there is one of them I have actually gained respect for having previously thought him grossly overrated. Georgy Zhukov... which is sort of strange given that he had all this intelligence available, but after looking at some of his actions with allocations of resources and preparation measures, and moving of commanders around even with the intelligence he did a pretty good job. He seemed to always be the one general who would pull the Soviets out of a bad situation where others had failed. There weren't too many great Soviet victories that he didn't have a decisive hand in....maybe none at all.
He reminds me more of a US Grant type, than a Robert E. Lee type, and that is what the Russians needed.
Soviet incompetence.
Any general who has overwhelming superiority in all arms should win. That you have to win with such losses as the Soviet army had is a mark of incompetence and Zhukov is no different.
So far as Citadel is concerned, despite all the hype about the Soviet victory and all the advantages the Soviet's had, they came with in an ace of losing, and that was down to Hitler, who for once bottled it and ignored Manstein, once to often.
Well you also have to make some allowance for the low quality of troops and officers especially at the Start of Barbarossa. Stalin's purges really screwed them up. Then later on when you finally got the good soviet equipment like the T-34 a large portion of their forces after Stalingrad were men conscripted from the territories just liberated with no training to speak of except what they got on the fly during combat.
Just as Manstein's losses were largely due to Hitler, the Soviet one's were largely due to Stalin. The difference being when those interferrences occurred, Stalin's early on and Hitlers later.
So far as Citadel is concerned, despite all the hype about the Soviet victory and all the advantages the Soviet's had, they came with in an ace of losing
More like an Ace a King and A Queen. The Northern arm of Citadel was stuffed pretty quickly, with only the most trivial gains and huge casualties for the Germans, the lower arm had more success because Hoth was a better offensive general and planner than Model but it never really got that close to success and after the massive tank battle when a German attack met a Russian advance it was doomed. The Tank Strength of the Germans crippled and unlike the Soviets they had no additional reserves to speak of. The Soviets still had quite a few reserves they hadn't committed and were saving for the Counteroffensive as well as reserves in other sectors. For the Germans to win citadel they would have to draw three inside straights in a row. The Germans did better than could be expected at the Battle of Prochorovka, yet it was the end of the offensive. They indeed drew an Ace and they still didn't suceeed. The Ace they did draw was because Soviet intelligence got one thing wrong, they had the Northern arm of the attack being the strongest when it was the Southern Wing. Had they got this right the Germans would not have done as well as they did, even though they still didn't get very far, and the attack was called off because the Russians were gaining far more in the North than the Germans were in the South.
LOL well your sources are completely different to mine.
From my reading of just about everything I can lay my hands on for the last 40 odd years, it was like this.
The northern arm did indeed stall.
The Southern not only smashed through arguably the most formidable defensive position ever created by man, and defeated all before it, but when the Soviets brought in their strategic reserves from 200 miles behind the line they were also destroyed. Now the Southern limb of the German attack was at a an average strength for units of their type, but the official returns of the units the day after Prokhorovka show that because of tanks not in the fight and being returned after repair the Germans were down 8 tanks over all. The Soviets depending on who you read lost between 5-800 in that battle.
The most telling thing is that after the battle, an SS Obergruppenfuhrer and corps commander of 2 SS panzer divisions was able to walk around the battle field not once but twice, and no Soviet snipers took a pot shot at him. he went round twice as he wanted to count the destroyed enemy tanks, there were so many he thought he must have double counted, so he went round again, on foot with chalk and numbered them.
Manstein wanted to carry on, Hitler bottled it because of Italy and Mussolini and called off Manstein and the moment passed.
I would heartily commend you read all the German versions which tend to include figures on daily returns. Unlike Soviet generals whose accounts are mainly fantasy. Descriptions of hordes of SS Panthers storming over a hill at Prokhorovka are utterly wrong, there were no Panthers in the southern arm, they were all with GD in the north.
Since the war of course many myths and fantasies have arisen and these are no promulgated by the internet.
The Southern arm swung further east than the Russians expected, so it made good progress for a time, but they didn't exactly smash though the lines, they broke through the first couple layers then rather than go head on and cross the river Hoth wisely decided to head east to deal with any reinforcements before the crossing. Army Group Kempf had been slowed greatly by the Soviets so wasn't there to secure the right flank. And in the North Model narrowly avoided a "Super Stalingrad" and the encirclement of his entire force.
Well the two armies met and the Germans did indeed achieve a tactical victory ala Pyrrhus of Epirus at Prochorovka, but the operational and strategic victories went clearly to the Soviets despite heavy losses. It was a senseless ploy by the Germans especially after Manstein, in a bout of battle insanity, convinced Hitler to allow the southern attack to continue after the North was admitted to be a total failure. It was over and the Germans were just throwing more men and equipment away that they could not afford to.
The maps say it all
The Plan:
Reality:
More Reality:
now lets drive reality home even more:
and even more:
The Southern arm never got close to their actual objective and the Northern arm did even worse. The Russians retook Kharkov and then Kiev, cut off Crimea and German Army Group A. The Germans couldn't even manage to hold the defensive line at the Dniepr afterwards (so much for the famed Wotan line) due to their losses and also lost the economically important Donbass region. Face it the Germans threw away the forces they needed to defend the entire front, without Kursk they certainly should have been able to hold Kharkov, the Donbass, and especially Kiev a whole lot longer, not gotten Crimea cut off. Even had they called off the Southern wing of the attack when they called off the Northern one they might have held some of those. They should have gone with Mansteain's "backhand" that he preferred initially rather than Citadel and then pushing that long after it was an obvious failure.
Suppose Manstein was able to continue a serious push after Prochorovka.... what is he going to achieve other than getting encircled and totally destroyed? Especially bearing in mind that the German Airforce would have not been able to maintain their local air superiority in the region as they had during Prochorovka with the Russians advancing elsewhere.
I would heartily commend you read all the German versions which tend to include figures on daily returns. Unlike Soviet generals whose accounts are mainly fantasy.
The Germans are as full of fantasy as the Russia and at time, especially Manheim, who denied reality long after the war about the battle as many historians, non-Russian, have correctly pointed out.
Did the Germans inflict massive casualties at Prochorovka? absolutely but they really weren't much of a force afterwards. They were often driving around with tanks with multiple ad hoc repair jobs because they were unable to send them back for proper repairs. The 200 or so largely beaten up tank force remaining after Prochorovka wasn't going to change the front.
Manstein wanted to carry on, Hitler bottled it because of Italy and Mussolini and called off Manstein and the moment passed.
Hitler called it off primarily because of the Soviet Counterattack in the North and Kharkov being threatened and the Couterattack to the South at the Minus river, but at Mansteins insistence he allowed the Southern attack to go on longer yet the Germans never managed to take Prochorovka despite being on the doorstep. They didn't even have enough juice left for that, and Hitler had ordered the reserves ( XXIV Panzer Corps) not to enter the Kursk salient but instead support the First Panzer Army at the Minus on July 17th, 5 days after Prochorovka. The commitment of Manstein to Kursk had left the entire south weak and now the Russians wer pushing back hard and threatening Crimea, the Donbass, and perhaps even encircling the entire Southern Wing of the exposed Citadel attack.
The German armor fought well but it was a poor plan and they never really had much chance even though luck went their way during much of it in the South.
In short there really are only 2 valid "What if's" regarding Kursk.
1. What if the Soviets had no intelligence of the plan aside from what they could determine on the actual front.
2. What if Hitler had ok'd Mansteins preferred plan of a backhand campaign allowing the Soviets to attack first and then counterattacking.
Any other what if to me seems to divorced from the realities of war for my tastes
Oh and BTW the forces sent eventually to Italy left most of their heavy equipment, much of it goin to tottenkopf that had lost over half its operational tanks at Prochorovka.
Let me make one final point about how disastrous the German attack at Kursk was.
In 1943, T-34 production had reached an average of 1,300 per month, that is 15,600 a year, about 3 times as many as Panzer IV and Panther tanks combined And they were producing twice as many Kliment Voroshilov tanks as the Germans were Tigers.
Kursk was the Nazi Borodino, except that unlike Napoleon the Germans never went on to capture Kursk, much less Moscow.
LOL, well you can put up all the maps and figures you like, the tactical victory was not Pyrrhic until a month later, at the time it would have been a strategic victory if they had carried on, now far be it for me to question your wisdom, but given the choice between yours and Manstein's on the field, I am afraid I will go with the latter, a properly great general.
I have said it before and I will say it again, the various "histories" vary vastly in quality, the Russians even today cannot give as accurate figures as the Germans did on the day after the event.
If you read the histories and biographies of the German participants one thing strikes you, even in translation, and that is the style, they are all written like combat reports and they refer to figures from the daily returns. In short they are much more believable than the fantasy of Soviet generals, historians, or the prognostications of western "historians" who were not even born and usually dare not say what actually happened for fear of being labelled a "N" word sympathiser.
Again as I have said before I rank eyewitness and contemporary accounts in order of Nationality, mainly on the basis that German officers (not politicians) find it very difficult to lie, unlike many of their contemporaries. So:
German
British
US
French
Italian
Russian
I have left out Japanese as I have not read many (if any) first hand accounts of any actions.
As for your maps anyone with a crayon can draw a map.
Again, I commend Manstein, Hauser, and the rest.
Again, we clearly differ so that is that.
As for what ifs, well if it wasn't for a very few understrength but fanatical SS panzer divisions the Russians would have been at the Channel, before D Day and that would have been a whole different kettle of fish.
Manstein was smoking from a crackpipe, and I'm sure many of his people smoked from the same one. I don't dispute the numbers they thought were correct, but rather the whole assumption that they could achieve anything other than becoming encircled and destroyed like at Staligrad.
The Germans just simply did not have the resources, and this offensive stalled when the Russians after Prochorovka. Hell the Germans were unable to take the town after that less than 10 kilometers away. And this was against the same forces they had just won a tactical victory over. In no way can one realistically imagine they would achieve much given that. They were throwing men and equipment away on a Pyrrhic campaign.
And I too have read many accounts and the conclusion is pretty obvious, the experts largely disagree with Manstein's pipedream, although there are a few that share it, most seem to agree that his attack had no future except possible destruction of a far greater portion of his force. He had no northern wing of the attack to hook up with, he had inadequate forces to surround anything, and only the ineptness of the Russian attacks at Prochorovka gave him a tactical victory there, but one Manstein couldn't follow up on with anything significant once the Russians moved to a defensive posture. Had he been reinforced he would almost certainly have been cut off as his southern flank protected by those reinforcements on the minus and elsewhere would have not been available to slow a Russian encirclement. Mainstein had become focused on a narrow area and lost total sight of the Strategic picture, or which he likely had not much clue about in the first place, but the historians that criticize a further push by Manstein do and this is where they are far more knowledgable in hindsight than the blinded Germans who called for it at the time were.
Mansteins later writings make many errors on this.
For example he wrote:
by 9th July it had been possible to break through the last position into the area of Prokhorovka and Oboyan
But Army Group South was still fighting in the Soviet 2nd line on the 9th. It had only managed to reach half the distance to Oboyan by the end of the 9th.... 35 kilometers away.... and they didn't get to outside of Prokhorovka until the 11th, and that was not even an objective of Citadel but a sidetrip.
Now reality, according to German reports from the night of the 8th form 48th Panzer Corps (advancing on the left flank towards Oboyan):
In the evening the aerial recon is reporting a large concentration of tanks behind the enemy lines in on the Eastern flank of the SS-Panzercorps, in front of the SS-Panzercorps and the 48th Panzercorps and on the Western flank in front of the 52nd Army Corps up until Dmitrievka.
Opposite the front of the corps [48th] 30–40 tanks, 80 tanks North-West of Verkhopenye and 35 tanks at Syrtsovo. Near Dmitrievka at the flank of the 52nd AC also about 50 tanks. High concentration of enemy forces indicates intent to encircle the whole wedge of troops participating in “Citadel”.
On the 13th the Left Flank of Army Group South started crumbling.
From the battle log of the 48th Panzercorps for 12th July:
The corps commander maintains the decision to begin the advance at 15:00 to trap the enemy who is attempting to block our advance across r. Psel [North-Eastwards]. The artillery barrage is scheduled for 15:00.
However the situation develops differently. The attacks on the western and northern front of the corps hinder the planned execution of the order. At 13:30 enemy tanks, having received a reinforcement of 40 vehicles have captured hill 258.5 and are continuing to advance eastwards [that means there’s a breakthrough on the left - western flank of the corps]. The urgently dispatched battalion of the 394th GrR [Grenadier Regiment, of the 3rd PzD] was broken and dispersed. At Verkhopenye and the hills to the west of it there is tank fire already [Verkhopenye was a critical cornerstone of the left flank, being the main crossing across river Pena, which was covering the German left flank]. All we have in the area is minor anti-air cover units. At this decisive moment communication is lost with the 3rd PzD. Commander of the 3rd PzD Lt. Gen. Westhoven, feeling a grave threat to the rear of the corps decides on his own accord to cancel the advance northwards and turns the division front to the west and south-west. The panzer regiment is rushed east to meet the advancind enemy. At 15:45 the communication with the 3rd PzD is reestablished.
Corps commander validates the decision of the commander of 3rd PzD and decides to cancel the advance northwards and divert the Pz Brigade “Großdeutschland” to attack hill 258.5. The Army HQ is in full accord with this and thinks that we should safeguard our rear before moving further north. The enemy is intending, without doubt, to perform a deep tank strike by moving tank forces from the west.
…
17:00. The 52nd Army Corps reports that the enemy is attacking all along the corps front. The 332nd inf. division has the objective to start the advance northwards, but it is engaged on the front and both flanks. So far Berezovka is held, its recon battalion is holding near hill 237.6 to the North of Berezovka. The enemy is advancing to the west of it through Dolgy towards Chapayev-Rakovo with tanks and powerful infantry. South of Pena the Russians have achieved a breakthrough at Mikhailovka. The 332nd inf. div. is shifting to the defensive at the western outskirts of Cherkasskoye”.
Manstein wrote that the Soviet Couteraccks had been all beaten off by the 9th, ROTFLMAO....
Cherkasskoye-Verkhopenye is a 20km long line that is the extremely extended left flank Army Group South - the 48th Panzerkorps. The 48th by 12th of July is facing west on a 40km front and advancing towards Prokhorovka to the North-East. The cancellation of the advance north on the 12th turned out to be permanent - the advance was not scheduled on the next day and the corps was forced to focus all of its efforts on defending on the left flank.
On the 13th, 48th Panzerkorps was on the defensive, fighting strong counterattacks from the west, the 3rd Panzer Division and Grossdeutchland that were supposed to strike towards Oboyan were turned left to reinforce defence on the left flank. 2nd SS corps was stopped by suicidal frontal assault in front of Prokhorovka on the 12th, and pushed back 3 kilometers. Das Reich, the next unit to the right that was supposed to encircle Prokhorovka from the South was stuck in heavy fighting trying to push the Soviets Eastwards. This was the right flank of the 2nd SS corps. If Das Reich could not move, the right flank of the 2nd SS corps would open if it tried to advance. Further right, Kempf had only managed to break through the second line on the 12th and was also now bogged down in heavy fighting.
On the 13th the Germans could have re-started the assault on Prokhorovka, but they would have to do so with two open flanks
So when you read anything Manstein wrote, it is good to realize he made many factual errors in the writing, that an actual study of German battle logs will clearly reveal these errors. Manstein certainly isn't the best source to base assessments on.
On the 11th the battle log of the OKW :
Due to the fact that quick success is not achievable currently the only viable objective is to inflict maximum damage to the enemy at minimal cost to our own forces
So they had basically given up on taking Kursk and the objectives of Citadel, and now sought only to bloody the Russians, a strategic victory was beyond hope. All they could do, and what the did do afterwards was to beat back Soviet counterattacks because they couldn't press onwards offensively. After Prokhorovka the suicidal soviet counterattacks ceased, the Russians went more defensive, their lines shortened and the Germans were unable to make any headway on the objectives of Citadel and the objectives to substantially bloody the Soviets at low cost to themselves.
Soviet orders of Vatutin on the 12th:
Through dogged defence of the armies of the Front severe losses had been inflicted on the enemy in equipment and manpower, the enemy plan of taking Oboyan’-Kursk had been foiled.
However the enemy had not completely abandoned offensive objectives and is trying daily to bypass Oboyan’ to the east and to expand the captured area.
In order to completely exhaust the forces of the enemy advance, the armies of the Voronezh Front are to shift to determined defense at current positions with the objective of preventing any enemy breakthrough of our defensive lines…
After Prokhorovka Vatutin called off counteroffensives officially on the 16th and there was no more German success.
Citadel was doomed to failure from the start, and the Soviets were able to replace their tank losses at Prokhorovka in under a month with new tanks, whereas the Germans could not replace their elite tank crews and many of the tanks they had that weren't lost were hastily repaired in the field and not in good condition. Also not in good condition were their men who were largely spent.
Again as I have said before I rank eyewitness and contemporary accounts in order of Nationality, mainly on the basis that German officers (not politicians) find it very difficult to lie, unlike many of their contemporaries.
Well Manstein didn't find it hard to lie, LOL All counterattacks brushed aside by the 9th LOL...
German Generals like anyone else will try to cover their ass on the bad decisions they make and Manstein certainly didn't let the facts get in the way of his attempt to rewrite history, the battle logs of the other Germans there make that clear.
Again, I commend Manstein,
And THAT is the problem with your view.
The problem with my view, is that it is what happened, NOT what was dreamed up decades later by the PC crowd. Now I know you love to cut and paste, but try to actually read some history , in book published before it became unfashionable to tell what happened, I have well over 50 on the subject many first hand accounts, and I will not defer to revionists, I prefer those that tell the tale rather than the fantasy created after the event to fit a current fashion.
LOL Manstein the problem, Hahhahahhahaahhahaahhahahahahahahahahahahahhahahahahahahahahahahahaha
Now I know you love to cut and paste, but try to actually read some history
Like Manstein's own writings I quoted and demonstrated to be in obvious error? =P
If it is in such obvious error, can it be considered real history? Not in my book. What it is instead is a historical opinion after the fact based on the somewhat faulty memory of an ex-Nazi. I prefer the facts.
Also real history is like real science, when obvious errors were made in theory earlier one must admit them to move forward. Clinging to disproven history is like clinging to a geocentric model after it has been demonstrated that the Sun doesn't revolve around the Earth.
We shall agree to differ as usual 
As good fellows may. 
Adventure Follies → General Stuff → The Soviets were not as good in WWII as I gave them credit for
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